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I. Emergent Properties 
 
One way metaphysical materialists have tried to resolve the mind-body problem is by suggesting 
that consciousness might be understood as an "emergent property" of matter. 
 
An “emergent property” is a property of a system that arises due to the interaction of the 
elements of that system, where none of the elements have that property by themselves. For 
instance, harmony might be said to be an emergent property of a choir’s singing. None of the 
individual voices in the choir have the property of harmony by themselves, but when all of the 
voices combine in a certain way, harmony is produced.    
 
The idea is that when matter arranges itself in a particular dynamic form (such as a living brain) 
consciousness, for some mysterious reason, emerges as a "property" of that material form. 
 
But the more one reflects on this idea, the more one realizes it to be seriously flawed. Indeed, it 
would make more sense to think of matter as an emergent property of consciousness. 
 
 
II. Consciousness and Properties 
 
To understand this we need to consider what we mean by 'property.' 
 
There are basically two ways to think of a 'property': 
 
A 'property' may be thought of as the way something appears (to a consciousness) under certain 
circumstances. Thus, H2O has the property of liquidity when it appears to a human 
consciousness at room temperature. If something the size of an electron were conscious, and 
were wandering around within a bowl of H2O, the H2O would not appear to it as liquid; it would 
not have the ‘property’ of liquidity. 
 
Similarly, the harmony of a choir exists as such only for one who hears it. The ‘property’ of 
harmony results from the way the combined voices affect the listening consciousness.   
 
A ‘property,’ in this sense, is an appearance to a consciousness. 
 
To say that consciousness is an emergent property of matter, in this sense, would be to say that 
matter will appear (to consciousness) as consciousness when organized in a certain manner. But 
this makes no sense, for consciousness would already have to be there in order for matter to 





But we might mean by 'property' - not the way something appears under certain circumstances - 
but the way something functions under certain circumstances. 
 
In this sense, digestion is a 'property' of the human gastrointestinal system. It is an emergent 
property in that all the elements of the system must work together for digestion to occur. It is not 
a property of any of the system's elements considered in isolation. 
 
To say that consciousness is an emergent property, in this sense, would be to equate 
consciousness with the physical operations of the system in which it occurs. 
 
But this also makes no sense, for consciousness is not reducible to a physical operation. 
 
We might fully describe the electro-chemical operations of the brain without learning anything at 
all about the nature of the consciousness associated with those operations. This is not true of 
digestion. To fully describe the physical operations of the gastrointestinal system is to describe 
digestion. 
 
Thus, the notion that consciousness might be an emergent property of matter is based on a 
flawed analogy. Either it conceives of consciousness as an object of consciousness, or as a series 
of physical interactions. But consciousness is clearly neither.  
 
 
III. Is Matter an Emergent Property? 
 
Indeed, it would make more sense to conceive of matter as an emergent property of 
consciousness. 
 
In this case, we would be saying that consciousness itself appears (to human consciousness) as 
matter under certain circumstances. This is a way of conceiving of the relationship between 
consciousness and matter that, anyway, would be true to the "emergent property" analogy. 
 
Thus, we would posit that everything in the universe - including what appears to us as matter - is 
a configuration of consciousness. Under certain circumstances - the circumstances of human 
existence - some part of this fundamental consciousness appears as matter to human 
consciousness.  
 
In other words, our experience of the objective world as having the properties we associate with 
materiality emerges from the manner in which our own subjective consciousness interacts with 
what we might call “objective consciousness,” i.e., the objective world.     
 
This suggests that consciousness, at base, is not the ethereal, insubstantial, thing we generally 




It also suggests that human consciousness is but a form of a more fundamental and universal 
consciousness that likely has attributes, characteristics, and a basic ontology that is only partially 
on display in human consciousness. 
 
This seems to me the only plausible solution to the "mind-body problem." 
 
